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Should UNCLOS or GATT/WTO Decide
Trade and Environment Disputes?
Lakshman D. Guruswamy
The absence of compulsory judicial settlement is a serious
weakness in the embryonic international legal system. The Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's World Trade Organiza-
tion, (referred to jointly herein as GATT/WTO), which possesses
a unique system of compulsory and binding dispute settlement,
endeavors to overcome this weakness by bringing all trade-re-
lated disputes under its jurisprudential canopy. This system of
compulsory dispute settlement can be seen as a jewel in the
crown of free trade under which the world has enjoyed nearly
half a century of unrivaled economic growth, prosperity, and
comity.
In contrast, international environmental law (IEL) institu-
tions1 are fragmented and lack the WTO's global authority, or-
ganizational structure, financial backing, and legal status. With
the exception of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), IEL forums lack the international jurisdic-
tion, authority, and implementing powers of the WTO. 2 Because
of their institutional and legal prominence, GATT panels and
the new, stronger WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) have
emerged as the sole legal forum for resolving disputes where the
goals of environmental protection and free trade conflict.
1. Organizations which have environmental functions include the Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization
(ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Meteorological Organ-
ization (WMO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN Educa-
tion, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP), and the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD). This partial list illustrates the fractured nature of international orga-
nizations exercising oversight over fragmented areas of IEL.
2. None of the organizations referred to in note 1, supra, possess a com-
pulsory system of dispute settlement or an overarching institutional body such
as the WTO. The mission of the United Nations Environment Program, the
most overtly environmental organization amongst them, is to persuade and con-
vince states of the need for action by providing information, expertise and ad-
vice. UNEP does not, however, possess any executive or judicial powers.
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Environmentalists have a number of reasons to fear this as-
sertion of jurisdiction by GATT/WTO. 3 First, the substantive
law of GATT/WTO ignores international law dealing with envi-
ronmental protection and treats any law or treaty not embodied
in GATT or its "Covered Agreements" 4 as irrelevant.5 Second,
the track record of GATT litigation demonstrates the extent to
which international environmental protection has been dimin-
ished. As we shall see, GATT panels view IEL trade restrictions
as obstructions to the painfully engineered legal regime created
by the GATT/WTO which is aimed at liberalizing trade by elim-
inating controls and restrictions. 6 Third, the judges who inter-
pret such substantive trade law are unfamiliar with, and
possibly unfriendly toward, the laws and agreements directed
at international environmental protection. 7 Furthermore, these
judges are prevented from engaging in the customary judicial
role of interpreting and developing the law."
Part I of this Article emphasizes the importance of UN-
CLOS.9 It argues that within key areas of potential conflict, the
substantive international environmental obligations and dis-
pute settlement procedures of UNCLOS countervail GATTI
WTO. Part II demonstrates that, in addition to incorporating
substantive principles of IEL, UNCLOS creates a binding sys-
tem of adjudication and dispute resolution that confers upon its
legal forums the jurisdiction and adjudicatory authority to hear
trade and environment disputes. Additionally, even where
states are not parties to UNCLOS, but nevertheless accept its
provisions as codifications of customary IEL, the International
3. The arguments for this position are delineated more fully in Lakshman
Guruswamy, The Promise of UNCLOS: Justice in Trade and Environment Dis-
putes, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 1998). This Article is intended to supple-
ment and extend the arguments made in the above cited article.
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947], amended by Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, Annex II, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY
RoUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
5. See infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text (explaining the exclusion
of international environmental law from GATT panels' analysis).
6. See infra notes 116-42 and accompanying text (discussing GATT's
treatment of environmental issues).
7. See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text (examining the interpre-
tive role of GATT/WTO judges).
8. See id.
9. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21
I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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Court of Justice (ICJ) might be in a position to adjudicate trade
and environment disputes.
The countervailing jurisdiction of UNCLOS in trade and en-
vironment disputes could raise some concerns and even give rise
to the specter of judicial uncertainty resulting from competing
jurisdiction between two lawfully constituted international
tribunals. First, might there be a race to the most favorable
courthouse? Second, what about the confusion and uncertainty
resulting from two tribunals exercising jurisdiction over the
same case? Third, might the absence of established rules of in-
ternational law governing clashes between tribunals asserting
concurrent jurisdiction lead to a form of judicial anarchy, in
which UNCLOS and WTO tribunals joust with each other for
judicial supremacy? Finally, how might the conflicting orders of
these tribunals be implemented or enforced? Part III of this Ar-
ticle addresses these concerns.
The question of competing jurisdiction amongst tribunals
established by treaties (intergovernmental tribunals) has not
hitherto been addressed by treaty or customary law. 10 In the
absence of treaty or customary norms governing how interna-
tional tribunals should act, two other sources of public interna-
tional law-"the general principles of law" and "the judicial
decisions . . . of the various nations"'1'-must be examined.
There is no doubt that "general principles of law" enjoy parity of
legal status, albeit not of importance, with treaties and custom,
as primary sources of international law. The Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice underscores the primary status of
"general principles" by characterizing the other source of inter-
national law, "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists," as "subsidiary" means for determin-
ing the rules of law. 12
This Article argues that the aforementioned general princi-
ples of law can be adopted or derived from conflict of laws juris-
prudence (Conflicts) dealing with jurisdiction among the
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. The Restate-
ment maintains that a domestic court possessing prescriptive or adjudicatory
jurisdiction may not exercise that jurisdiction if it is unreasonable to do so. It
asserts that the principle of reasonableness is based on customary international
law. See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text. The Restatement is refer-
ring to jurisdiction exercised by domestic courts and not to the law governing
intergovernmental tribunals.
11. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(c)-
(d), 59 Stat. 1031, 1976 U.N.Y.B. 1052.
12. Id. art. 38(d).
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domestic courts of various countries. Conflicts analysis divides
jurisdiction into two parts: legislative or prescriptive jurisdic-
tion, and judicial jurisdiction.' 3 Furthermore, there are two pri-
mary principles that can be ascertained from Conflicts theory
dealing with issues of conflicting jurisdiction: reasonableness
and fairness. These foundational principles also undergird
other, more specific supplemental principles such as forum non
conveniens, comity, and choice of law. This Article adopts that
analysis and seeks to apply the primary and supplemental gen-
eral principles of law to the potential jurisdictional clash be-
tween GATT/WTO and UNCLOS. It concludes that the
application of these general principles of law, and the judicial
decisions of the various countries, justify the assertion of both
legislative and judicial jurisdiction by UNCLOS tribunals.
The Conflicts experience in analogous cases also demon-
strates that many of the fears articulated above are unfounded,
and that conflicting jurisdiction does not give rise to judicial an-
archy. Domestic courts in different countries have arrived at a
functional and legal understanding and accommodation of each
other's concurrent jurisdiction. They have attempted to resolve
conflicts on the basis of legal principle rather than caprice.
The answers to questions relating to the legislative and ju-
dicial jurisprudence of GATT/WTO and UNCLOS assume a fur-
ther foundational premise: that both forums are engaged in the
common pursuit of justice rather than of judicial hegemony.
This Article argues that the application of general principles of
law, as well as the judicial decisions of the various nations,
should obligate UNCLOS tribunals to exercise judicial jurisdic-
tion in trade and environment disputes.
The Article concludes by arguing for justice in trade and en-
vironment disputes. The prospect of an UNCLOS challenge may
break the GATT/WTO adjudicatory monopoly, and could initiate
reforms that accommodate international environmental law. A
reformed GATT/WTO system that deals fairly and justly with
environmental questions would remove the need to seek relief
from UNCLOS.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNCLOS
The global environmental importance of UNCLOS, which
came into force on November 16, 1994,14 has not fully been ap-
13. See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text (discussing conflicts of
law problems).
14. See UNCLOS, supra note 9.
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preciated. As then-U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher
pointed out in his letter submitting UNCLOS to President Clin-
ton, UNCLOS "[i]s the strongest comprehensive environmental
treaty now in existence or likely to emerge for quite some
time. 15 It lays the foundations of a constitution for the oceans.
Fifty-nine of its three hundred and twenty provisions obligate
environmental protection and conservation, and the broad scope
of those provisions makes it clear that UNCLOS is a far-reach-
ing and fundamental IEL agreement. 16 UNCLOS is not only an
IEL treaty, it is also a codification and articulation of the envi-
ronmental rules and principles applicable to the oceans. These
rules and principles have ascended to the status of customary
IEL because of their wide acceptance, and are therefore binding
on both signatories and non-signatories.1 7
Oceans occupy over seventy percent of the earth's surface
and act in many ways as a proxy for the global environment.
Most pollution enters the oceans through direct and indirect
pathways from land,18 and the control of oceanic pollution re-
quires the use of land-based controls to limit air, land and
water pollution. Furthermore, notable areas of oceanic govern-
ance, such as the conservation of wetlands, coastal areas, and
biodiversity, are among the most critical issues confronting in-
15. Letter of Submittal of the Secretary of State to the President of the
United States, in Message from the President of the United States and Commen-
tary Accompanying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and
the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of the Part XI Upon Their Trans-
mittal to the United States Senate for Its Advice and Consent, 7 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 77, 81 (1994).
16. In light of UNCLOS's broad environmental mandate, this Article re-
jects the apprehensive approach of commentators who take an inhibitory and
narrow view of the environmental reach of UNCLOS. For example, Richard J.
McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United States' Use of Trade Sanc-
tions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and Other International Marine
Living Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1994), argued that UNCLOS will restrict
actions by countries such as the United States to protect the international envi-
ronment. McLaughlin's views were based on a misconception about the reach of
UNCLOS, and he offered a "revised analysis" in Richard J. McLaughlin, Set-
tling Trade-Related Disputes over the Protection of Marine Living Resources:
UNCLOS or the WTO?, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 29, 32 (1997), that is
more in accord with the thesis of this Article. As described in this section, UN-
CLOS incorporates an extensive and inclusive mandate, not a restrictive or con-
fining one. Compare Jonathan I. Charney, Entry Into Force of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 381, 391 n.58 (1995) (dis-
agreeing with position taken in McLaughlin's 1994 article).
17. See Martin H. Belsky, The Ecosystem Model Mandate for a Comprehen-
sive United States Ocean Policy and Law of the Sea, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 417,
470 (1989).
18. See THE OECD REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 71 (1991).
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ternational environmental protection in general. UNCLOS
deals with the conservation and the management of living re-
sources, pollution prevention, reduction and control, vessel pol-
lution and environmental management.
One of the dominant characteristics of UNCLOS is that it is
an umbrella convention that brings other international rules,
regulations and implementing bodies within its canopy. Many
of UNCLOS's provisions are of a constitutional, or general, char-
acter. They are intended to be augmented by specific regula-
tions, rules and implementing procedures formulated by other
international agreements and by nation States.
Article 197 illustrates how UNCLOS is interlocked with
other treaties. It directs that
States shall co-operate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a
regional basis, directly or through competent international organiza-
tions, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards
and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Con-
vention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment, taking into account characteristic regional features.
1 9
When Article 197 is read in conjunction with Article 237, UN-
CLOS's jurisdictional reach becomes abundantly clear. Article
237 deals with obligations under other conventions that protect
and preserve the environment and it explains that the provi-
sions of UNCLOS are "without prejudice to the specific obliga-
tions assumed by states under special conventions and
agreements concluded previously which relate to the protection
and preservation of the marine environment and to agreements
which may be concluded in furtherance of the general principles
set forth in this convention." 20 Having made this point, UN-
CLOS Article 237 goes on to clarify that "[sipecific obligations
assumed by States... should be carried out in a manner consis-
tent with the general principles and objectives of this Conven-
tion."2 1 It is noteworthy that Article 237 covers both past and
future agreements, holding that they should be implemented in
a manner consistent with UNCLOS's general principles.
Significant IEL treaties that may be antithetical to GATT
are an important part of UNCLOS's design, environmental ob-
jective and architecture. 22 Not only are many of the specific obli-
19. UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 197.
20. UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 237.
21. Id.
22. These include the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-10 (1987) (as adjusted by
S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-09 (1992)), 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987) (as adjusted by 32
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gations assumed in these IEL treaties "consistent" with
UNCLOS, they are an integral and necessary part of UNCLOS's
environmental umbrella. Pursuant to this legal scheme, UN-
CLOS Article 293 declares that an UNCLOS tribunal shall "ap-
ply this Convention and other rules of international law not
incompatible with this Convention."23
The UNCLOS model is remarkably different from that of
GATT/WTO. When they begin to function, UNCLOS tribunals
will be interpreting and applying a formidable number of envi-
ronmental provisions whose objective is to advance interna-
tional environmental protection, not to liberalize trade. In
dramatic contrast, GATT/WTO dispute settlement bodies, set up
to implement a regime of liberal trade, are uncertain about IEL
and tend to diminish environmental protection. 24
II. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The substantive provisions of a treaty, however strongly
worded, can remain ineffectual in the absence of a system of
compulsory adjudication. The international legal system does
not possess a universal system of compulsory and binding dis-
pute settlement, and many international treaties are sadly lack-
ing in judicial enforcement. Consequently, nations and
international organizations are obliged to rely upon diplomatic
negotiations and other methods of dispute resolution. The ab-
sence of compulsory judicial adjudication is fast becoming recog-
nized as a serious weakness in the embryonic legal system of
international society.
It is in this context that GATT/WTO has assumed promi-
nence as an unique system of compulsory and binding dispute
settlement. The attention given to GATT/WTO appears to have
overshadowed the equally compulsory and binding dispute set-
tlement procedures under UNCLOS, as well as the more limited,
but nonetheless significant, jurisdiction of the ICJ. GATT/WTO
and UNCLOS are remarkable phenomena in the international
I.L.M. 874 (1992)) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T.
1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (reprinted at 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973)) [hereinafter
CITES]; Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989)
[hereinafter Basel Convention]; and the Convention for the Prohibition of Fish-
ing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, Nov. 24, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 1454
(1990) [hereinafter South Pacific Convention].
23. UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 293.
24. See infra notes 109-52 and accompanying text.
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community. They both possess unique systems of compulsory,
binding judicial settlement, and it is necessary to briefly con-
sider their principal features.
While UNCLOS does not create a 'World Oceanic Organiza-
tion," its dispute resolution provisions arguably are stronger and
more binding than those of GATT. 25 Even if the primacy of UN-
CLOS's dispute resolution regime is in issue, the undoubted ju-
risdiction of an UNCLOS tribunal, as opposed to a GATT/WTO
tribunal, could be invoked to settle disputes involving environ-
mental actions that may be contrary to GATT/WTO trade law.26
A brief comparison of GATT/WTO, UNCLOS and the ICJ illus-
trates the ability of each to adjudicate trade and environment
disputes.
A. GATT/WTO
In the years following World War II, GATT, and its succes-
sor organization, the WTO, have aspired to be the sole arbiter of
all disputes relating to international trade. Until 1994, how-
ever, the decisions of the prevailing panel system required af-
firmative approval by GATT, and were subject to single-member
veto power. Judicial hegemony was greatly advanced by the
1994 Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),2 7
which established a judicial-type dispute settlement system, in
contrast to the earlier, less binding, more consensus-oriented
system under GATT. The DSU ensures that all dispute settle-
ment procedures under GATT, the Subsidies Code and a variety
of other trade-related agreements (Covered Agreements) 28 are
brought within a single dispute resolution process overseen by
the DSB. 29 If parties are unable to negotiate a consensual set-
25. Support for this position and a fuller discussion of the relative strength
of the two regimes are offered by McLaughlin, Settling Trade-Related Disputes
over the Protection of Marine Living Resources: UNCLOS or the WTO?, supra
note 16, at 41-52.
26. See infra Part III.
27. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO], Annex II, art. 3, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RE-
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND vol. 1, (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU]. The DSU consists of twenty-seven articles and four appendixes. See id.
The purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system is to confer predictability
and security of outcome upon an international legal system that is lacking such
attributes. See id. art. 3(2).
28. See id. art. 1 and Appendix 1.
29. See id. art. 2. This ends the potential for forum shopping that existed
within the old GATT. The heart of the new system is the DSB, which is author-
ized to establish panels, adopt panel and appellate reports, monitor the imple-
[Vol. 7:287
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tlement of their dispute, a panel is set up to hear the case. The
findings of the Panel, subject to appeal, are accepted by the DSB
and are binding on the parties. 30
B. UNCLOS
The dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS share GATT/
WTO's objective of creating institutional procedures that lead to
certainty and security of outcome. Both treaties recognize the
difficulty of achieving their respective goals given that the ab-
sence of determinative and binding interpretations and rulings
by a system of compulsory dispute settlement leaves room for
destabilizing unilateral interpretations and acts. 31 Like GATT/
WTO, UNCLOS allows parties the opportunity of settling dis-
putes by peaceful means of their own choice at any time.32
UNCLOS's dispute settlement provisions are divided into
three sections.3 3 Section One contains seven articles 34 compris-
ing general provisions, with an emphasis placed upon the peace-
ful settlement of disputes pursuant to Article 33 of the Charter
of the United Nations (UN Charter).35 State parties can make
general, regional or bilateral agreements regarding the interpre-
tation or application of UNCLOS in lieu of its ordinary proce-
mentation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize retaliatory measures
in cases where States do not implement panel recommendations. See WTO,
supra note 27, at Annex II.
30. Although more judicial than GATT, the new WTO procedures are sub-
ject to legally possible, though politically difficult, countermand at every critical
stage in the procedure. There is no affirmative approval requirement, or single-
member veto power, as existed under the old GATT procedures. However, each
step in the process of setting up panels, along with their adoption and imple-
mentation, can be countermanded by a negative consensus decision of the DSB.
The dispute settlement procedure is activated by a request from a member
state whereupon the DSB, in the absence of a consensus decision not to do so,
establishes a well-qualified panel to hear the case. The panel examines the
matter in light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the
parties, to the dispute. After careful consideration, the panel submits its find-
ings in a report to the DSB. This report will be adopted by the DSB unless 1) a
party to the dispute formally appeals the panel decision, or 2) the DSB decides
by consensus not to adopt the report. Where there is an appeal, and the Appel-
late Body upholds the legal findings and conclusions of the panel, its report
shall be adopted by the DSB, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt
the decision. See DSU, supra note 27, arts. 16(4), 17(14).
31. See John Warren Kindt, Dispute Settlement in International Environ-
mental Issues: The Model Provided by the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1097, 1112 (1989).
32. UNCLOS, supra note 9, arts. 279-80.
33. See id. arts. 279-99.
34. See id. arts. 279-85.
35. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
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dures with respect to any dispute, as long as a binding decision
results. 36 This provision allows State parties the freedom to
choose the method of interpretation and dispute procedure most
compatible with the particular circumstances of their case and
its needs. Similarly, parties may submit their disputes to concil-
iation according to the conciliation procedures of UNCLOS. 37 If
no settlement can be reached by any method covered within Sec-
tion One or on the request of any party to a dispute, the dispute
will be submitted to a court or tribunal determined under UN-
CLOS Article 287.38
Section Two contains eleven articles and procedures 39 that,
subject to the narrow exceptions in Section Three, 40 establish a
compulsory dispute settlement system for binding decisions
under virtually all provisions of UNCLOS. This does not, how-
ever, create a unitary system of dispute settlement, because it
allows the parties to choose between one of four legal forums:
the International Court of Justice, a special International Tribu-
nal for the Law of the Sea, an international arbitral tribunal, or
a special technical arbitral tribunal. 41
Section Three exempts a limited number of disputes from
the dispute settlement procedures of Section Two.4 2 The excep-
tions vary, but are primarily aimed at recognizing territorial
sovereignty and military activities. These exceptions do not sig-
nificantly hamper the operation of UNCLOS's binding resolution
provisions.
The primary reasons for nations to have recourse to UN-
CLOS are found in the environmental shortcomings of GATT/
WTO. Hitherto, it appears that GATT/WTO has exercised judi-
cial suzerainty, because it has enjoyed a monopoly over trade-
environment litigation. According to conventional wisdom, un-
regulated monopolies stifle competition and result in huge ineffi-
36. UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 282.
37. See id. art. 284.
38. See id. art. 287.
39. See id. arts. 286-96.
40. See id. arts. 297-99.
41. See id. art. 287.
42. The exempted disputes relate primarily to marine scientific research
and fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zones. See UNCLOS, supra note 9,
arts. 297(2), 273(3). However, they remain subject to the conciliation proce-
dures. See id. art. 284. A state may also file an optional declaration that will
exclude binding dispute settlement in maritime boundary disputes and military
activities. See id. art. 298. Finally, disputes related to the deep sea bed are
referred to the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal of the
Law of the Sea. See id. art. 187.
[Vol. 7:287
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ciencies, inequities, and even abuse. GATTIWTO has been
behaving like a judicial monopoly, conscious that its decisions
cannot be challenged or overturned. The possibility of a coun-
tervailing judicial force, and competition for jurisdiction, could
have a salutary effect on GATT and even lead it to pay genuine
attention to reform.
C. UNCLOS AND THE ICJ
The United States has been challenged on numerous occa-
sions for violating GATT by taking unilateral action to protect
the international environment. 43 Because the United States has
not ratified UNCLOS, it is unable to take advantage of the envi-
ronmental jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals and will be pre-
cluded from access to its dispute settlement procedures. The
time may be ripe for the United States to revisit a prescient and
creative suggestion, made by Louis Sohn, that might give the
United States an opportunity to defend its actions in a neutral
forum.
4 4
Sohn's suggestion assumes the United States has not rati-
fied UNCLOS and is, therefore, denied access to UNCLOS's dis-
pute settlement procedures. Instead, based on the United
States' acceptance of the environmental provisions of UNCLOS
as a codification, or restatement, of customary international law,
his suggestion opens the door for the ICJ to interpret and apply
such law.
Sohn proposes that the United States might sign a supple-
mentary declaration under Article 36 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice by which it would accept the
jurisdiction of the IJC with respect to those rules of customary
international law codified in UNCLOS, with an exception for
deep sea bed mining if necessary. 45 Under Article 36(2), the
United States may declare that it recognizes as "compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other
state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court
in all legal disputes concerning ... (b) any question of interna-
tional law,"4 6 which would include the rules of customary IEL
codified in UNCLOS. This would confer jurisdiction, under the
43. See infra notes 120, 123, and 126 and accompanying text (discussing
the Tuna I, Tuna II, and Venezuela Gasoline Decision cases respectively).
44. See Louis B. SOHN & KRISTEN GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN A
NUTSHELL 238-246 (1984).
45. See id. at 245-46.
46. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 11, art. 36(2).
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"optional clause," on the Court over matters of the law of the sea
with respect to those states that have accepted its jurisdiction,
without adding crippling reservations. 47
It should be noted that the ICJ's compulsory jursidiction as
created by this course of action would be independent of the dis-
pute settlement provisions of UNCLOS. The fact that the ICJ
had been designated a judicial forum under Article 287(1)(b) of
UNCLOS would not give the ICJ jurisdiction over non-parties
such as the United States, who would still have no access to UN-
CLOS dispute settlement procedures.48 Instead, the jurisdiction
of the ICJ would arise from the fact that the states involved had
agreed to its jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the
ICJ. This would enable the ICJ to decide whether, for example,
the rules of customary international law, as codified in UN-
CLOS, might or might not prevail over GATT/WTO.
The course Sohn advocates is admittedly of limited applica-
tion. It would be confined to those countries that, first, have ac-
cepted the Article 36(2) jurisdiction of the ICJ, and second, have
not effectively negated their acceptance with crippling reserva-
tions of the 'self judging' variety.49 Nonetheless, it appears to be
a felicitous way of overcoming some obstacles, bringing the
United States within the customary environmental law um-
brella of UNCLOS, and possibly persuading the United States to
ratify the treaty. The existence of an impartial tribunal, and the
possibility that IEL can be re-affirmed in a non-GATTIWTO ju-
dicial context, would restore confidence in international adjudi-
cation and help strike the balance between free trade and
environmental protection.
As we have seen, the ICJ exercises consensual, not compul-
sory, jurisdiction, and will act as a judicial forum only in limited
circumstances. It is important, therefore, to consider a more
47. See id. Article 36(2) is titled the "optional clause" because the decision
to confer such jurisdiction is an option open to states.
48. See UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 291.
49. Of the 60 countries that have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ under
Article 36(2), almost three-quarters have made reservations to their declara-
tions of acceptance. Some of these reservations are very drastic. "Self-judging"
reservations allow the state, not the court, to declare that a case is removed
from the ICJ's jurisdiction because it is one involving domestic jurisdiction or
national security, as determined by the country concerned. For example the
U.S. Declaration under Article 36(2) is subject to the proviso that "disputes with
regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States of America as determined by the United States of America." See
ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1946-1996, 130-31
(1996).
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readily foreseeable situation in which an UNCLOS tribunal is
invited to exercise jurisdiction in a case over which a GATT/
WTO tribunal also exercises jurisdiction. Moreover, it is impor-
tant to do so in a scenario not involving the United States, be-
cause a number of other countries have committed themselves to
the protection of the international environment through the ex-
ercise of trade sanctions. A hypothetical scenario involving such
trade sanctions will illustrate how an UNCLOS adjudication
might work.
III. COMPETING JURISDICTION
Consider a hypothetical scenario in which New Polynesia is
a party to the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing With
Long Driftnets in the South Pacific (South Pacific Convention),50
GATT/WTO, and UNCLOS, while Kuroshito is a party only to
GATT/WTO and UNCLOS. Acting under Article 3(2)(c) of the
South Pacific Convention, New Polynesia bans the import of fish
caught by Kuroshito trawlers using driftnets, despite protests
that such a ban is illegal under GATT/WTO. After unsuccess-
fully exploring other avenues of settlement, New Polynesia sub-
mits this matter to the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea, established by UNCLOS. New Polynesia requests the Tri-
bunal, under Article 288(2) of UNCLOS, to examine the legality
of its actions under the South Pacific Convention. Kuroshito, on
the other hand, institutes proceedings under the dispute settle-
ment procedures of GATT/WTO pleading the illegality of such a
ban, and the case is referred to a panel by the DSB.
The first question is whether the UNCLOS Tribunal pos-
sesses jurisdiction despite GATT/WTO's competing claims. A
search for answers does not reveal any customary or treaty rules
that can be readily applied. It is important at this juncture to
clarify that we are addressing the customary law dealing with
the jurisdiction of intergovernmental tribunals and not the law
pertinent to domestic tribunals. As noted in the introduction to
this Article, the Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States avers that reasonableness has
emerged as a rule of customary international law, and that a
state may not exercise jurisdiction when it is unreasonable to do
so.51 The Restatement, however, addresses the issue of custom-
ary law applicable to domestic courts. It is important to distin-
50. See South Pacific Convention, supra note 22, art. 3(2)(c).
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403.
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guish the customary law applicable to domestic courts from that
which applies to the intergovernmental or international tribu-
nals discussed in this Article.
While this Article recognizes and embraces the existence of
customary law applicable to domestic courts, intergovernmental
or international tribunals that compete for jurisdiction present a
different picture. Currently, no compelling evidence of practice
or opinio juris substantiates the claim that reasonableness is a
rule of customary international law applicable to a clash of juris-
diction between intergovernmental tribunals. Faced with this
lacuna in customary and treaty law, we must look to other
sources of international law for answers.
Hersch Lauterpacht designed a conceptual compass for
dealing with lacunas in the law: "Whenever a question arises
which is not governed by an existing rule of international law...
or, in the absence of such a rule . . . the rich repository of 'gen-
eral principles' may legitimately be resorted to by a tribunal, a
Government, or the scholar grappling with a novel or difficult
situation."5 2 Furthermore, general principles "may apply to
agreements... between one ... [intergovernmental] organiza-
tion ... and another, between... [intergovernmental] organiza-
tions and States and, probably, between... [intergovernmental]
organizations and private individuals."5 3
Having recognized a repository of general principles as part
of the broader corpus of international law, we need to ascertain
where this repository might be located. Then, we must identify
any relevant principles that might apply to cases of conflicting
jurisdiction. Clearly, national legal systems are the repositories
for a substantial number of general principles, and international
law continues to recruit many of its rules from national laws. 54
Lauterpacht has documented the extent to which international
law is molded by domestic sources, analogies, and experience,55
expressing rules of uniform application in all or in the main sys-
tems of jurisprudence. 56
The jurisprudence dealing with, inter alia, the competing
jurisdiction of lawfully constituted national tribunals in differ-
52. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, International Law-The General Part, in 1 In-
ternational Law 71 (1970).
53. Id. at 74.
54. See International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 148
(Lord McNair concurring).
55. See generally HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALO-
GIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1927).
56. See id. at 69.
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ent nations that exercise jurisdiction over transnational transac-
tions falls within the province of conflict of laws, or private
international law. Consequently, Conflicts theory becomes a
source both of general principles of law and of judicial decisions
under general international law. 5 7
A survey of Conflicts cases dealing with competing jurisdic-
tion reveals two fundamental principles: fairness and reasona-
bleness. According to the Restatement, reasonableness is a rule
of customary international law applicable to domestic courts.58
While these principles enjoy the status of custom, they also qual-
ify as cardinal general principles of law applicable to intergov-
ernmental tribunals. These cardinal rules are expressed
through supplemental principles and rules such as comity, 59 fo-
rum non conveniens,60 and choice of law,6 1 all of which are based
on fairness and reasonableness. As a result, reasonableness and
fairness enjoy a dual legal character. They are both rules of cus-
tomary international law governing jurisdictional claims among
domestic tribunals, and general principles of law applicable to
intergovernmental tribunals.
Conflicts theory analyzes the concept of jurisdiction as trav-
ersing two different issues: legislative (or prescriptive) jurisdic-
tion and judicial jurisdiction. When applied to a putative clash
between UNCLOS and GATT, these concepts raise two ques-
tions. First, does an UNCLOS tribunal possess the jurisdiction,
power, or right to entertain the dispute? Conflicts of law com-
mentators refer to this question as one of legislative or prescrip-
tive jurisdiction.62 Second, assuming that UNCLOS does
possess legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction, should it exercise
this jurisdiction? This question is referred to as one of judicial
jurisdiction.63
The fact that UNCLOS is clothed with jurisdiction does not
mean that its jurisdiction ought to be exercised. The question of
judicial jurisdiction assumes that UNCLOS possesses the neces-
sary power, right or jurisdiction, and examines what legal crite-
ria should be used for deciding whether, or how, it should
exercise this authority. The secondary principles of comity, fo-
57. See supra text accompanying note 11.
58. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403 cmt.a.
59. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
62. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 1 (3d ed. 1996).
63. See id. at 1-5.
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rum non conveniens and choice of law are applicable to this sec-
ond question.
A. LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION
Returning to the hypothetical dispute introduced earlier, it
is necessary to examine both the legislative and judicial aspects
of UNCLOS's putative jurisdiction over the matter. The ques-
tion of legislative jurisdiction calls for affirmative answers to
two separate queries. First, is UNCLOS, by its own terms, em-
powered to settle disputes under the South Pacific Convention?
In order to answer this question, the South Pacific Convention
must qualify as an "international agreement related to the pur-
poses of [UNCLOS]" as contemplated by Article 288(2). It is nec-
essary to ascertain some relevant facts about driftnet fishing to
answer this question. Driftnet fishing, or "driftnetting," is a par-
ticularly harmful form of commercial fishing.
It is to be distinguished from "setnet fishing," which relies on fish
swimming into nets [and] ... can be made to isolate the particular
species they are intended to catch. Driftnets, which are suspended in
the water like giant curtains and strung out as a wall for many miles,
drift across the open ocean and indiscriminately catch everything in
their path. A single boat... can have up to 40 miles of such nets ... to
a depth of 48 feet . . . in a single positioning, and typically, several
vessels of a driftnet fleet will work together to fish in this manner ....
[11n any given fishing season ... up to 22,500 miles of deep nets ...
[drift] through the waters of the Pacific and Indian oceans each night-
enough to stretch more than once around the Earth. Driftnet fishing
... is sometimes called "wall of death fishing" because it kills most
living things in its path. Whatever they catch, driftnets kill or maim.
Marine creatures in search of food and lured by fish already caught in
the net, swim or dive into the webbing where they become entangled. If
they do not drown or manage to escape they may suffer for several
months before dying from injury, starvation or both.64
Driftnet fishing often leads to a catch rate exceeding a spe-
cies' breeding capability. The use of driftnets during the 1980s
caused the near collapse of the Albacore Tuna fishery in the
South Pacific and contributed to the serious decline of the North
American Salmon fishery.65 In view of these findings, the Gen-
64. LAKSHMAN D. GuRuSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER 747 (1994).
65. See id. at 748. See also Resolution on Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fish-
ing and its Impact on Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/225 (1989), 29 I.L.M. 1555, at 1558 [hereinafter 1989 UN
Driftnet Resolution]; Resolution on Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and its
Impact on Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/215 (1991), 31 I.L.M. 241 [hereinafter 1991 UN Driftnet Resolution].
This view has been challenged by others as ignoring the scientific evidence, see,
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eral Assembly of the United Nations recommended a morato-
rium on the use of large-scale pelagic driftnets in high-seas
fishing.66
The South Pacific Convention prohibits its member states,
and vessels documented under its laws, from engaging in
driftnet fishing within the South Pacific.67 It also directs parties
to engage in extensive reprisals against driftnet catches of non-
parties, including the prohibition of imports of fish and fish
products, processed or not, caught using a driftnet. 68 Moreover,
it directs parties to take further actions against non-parties, in-
cluding prohibiting the landing, processing and importation of
driftnet catches, prohibiting possession of driftnets and restrict-
ing port access. 69 It also empowers parties to take even stricter
measures than those expressly required. 70
The South Pacific Convention is an unmistakable offspring
of UNCLOS and is impacted by many of its provisions. A cluster
of UNCLOS provisions, referred to below, are particularly appli-
cable to driftnets on the high seas and are based upon the obli-
gations of fishing states to the wider international community. 71
They deal with the duty to take measures necessary to conserve
the living resources of the high seas. 72 This duty codifies the
customary law crystallized in Articles 1 and 2 of the 1958 Con-
vention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas, 73 and the International Court of Justice declara-
tion that a high-seas fishing state has an obligation to take full
account of fishery conservation "[flor the benefit of all."7 4
UNCLOS obligates its signatories to cooperate with others
to conserve marine resources7 5 and to contribute and exchange
e.g. William T. Burke et al., United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing: An
Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management, 25
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 127, 128 (1994).
66. See 1991 UN Driftnet Resolution, supra note 65, at 242.
67. See South Pacific Convention, supra note 22, art. 2.
68. See id. art. 3.
69. See id. arts. 3(2)(d)-(e), 3(3).
70. See id. art. 3(3).
71. What follows is based largely on W. Burke, The Law of the Sea Con-
cerning Coastal State Authority over Driftnets in the High Seas, in UNITED NA-
TIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (FAO) LEGISLATIVE STUDY 47
(1991).
72. See UNCLOS, supra note 9, arts. 61, 117.
73. 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 140 T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285 (1966).
74. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 30 (July 25).
75. See UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 118.
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scientific information, catch and effort statistics and other data
regarding conservation of stocks on the high seas.76 More im-
portant, it imposes a duty to take measures "[dlesigned, on the
best scientific evidence available to the states concerned, to
maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels
which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified
by relevant environmental and economic factors"77 and to ob-
serve treaty obligations.78 For these reasons, the UNCLOS Tri-
bunal could conclude that the South Pacific Convention is an
agreement related to the purposes of UNCLOS.
The second query with respect to legislative jurisdiction is
whether an UNCLOS Tribunal may claim jurisdiction in the
face of competing claims by a GATT/WTO panel. This question
addresses the fact that the UNCLOS Tribunal and the GATT/
WTO panel possess concurrent legislative jurisdiction conferred
upon them by their constituent corresponding treaties.
There are two aspects to this query. The first deals with the
internal jurisdictional provisions of UNCLOS itself. Two such
provisions merit attention: Articles 282 and 311(3). According to
Article 282,
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed through a
general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such dis-
pute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be submitted to a
procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in
lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to
the dispute otherwise agree.
79
This section refers to past agreements, and one of its key facets
is that an alternative procedure should entail a binding decision.
This raises the issue of whether GATT/WTO judicial decisions
are binding. As this Article has explained,8 0 Article 296 makes
all decisions of an UNCLOS court or tribunal final, without any
other intervening procedures. On the other hand, the final deci-
sions of a dispute panel or appellate body must be formally
adopted by all members of GATT/WTO and can be rendered inef-
fective by a negative consensus of the DSB. Under the circum-
stances, it is arguable that GATT/WTO does not issue binding
decisions of the kind contemplated by Article 282.
76. See id. art. 119(2).
77. See id. art. 119(1)(a).
78. See id. art. 116.
79. See id. art. 282 (emphasis added).
80. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, UNCLOS jurisdiction may be overridden only
in disputes regulated by cognate environmental treaties. Article
282 would apply, for example, if the facts of the dispute were
governed by an earlier conservation or environmental treaty on
the conservation of fish. It would not apply, though, to a pure
trade dispute, over which GATT/WTO exercises jurisdiction, or
to a environmental dispute with trade ramifications, over which
GATT/WTO purports to exercise jurisdiction. The thrust of this
argument is borne out by Article 311(3), which explicitly disal-
lows UNCLOS parties from entering into future agreements
that are incompatible with the "effective execution of the object
and purpose" of UNCLOS or that derogate from its "basic
principles."
Article 282 should be interpreted in light of the environmen-
tal objectives of UNCLOS, so clearly set out by, inter alia, Arti-
cles 311(3) and 237. We have seen that Article 237 recognizes
obligations contained in other treaties only to the extent that
they further, and are carried out in a manner consistent with,
the general principles and objectives of UNCLOS.8 1 As a result,
one may conclude that the treaties referred to in Article 282 are
cognate environmental treaties that are consistent with the gen-
eral principles of UNCLOS. They do not refer to unrelated trea-
ties such as GATT/WTO, which deals with trade liberalization
and not environmental protection.
Article 311 is a non-derogation clause. The eminent jurist
Shabtai Rosenne argues that Article 311 is a rare example of a
treaty obligation so precisely worded that it may nullify a con-
flicting later treaty such as GATT/WTO. s2 Further support for
Rosenne's closely knit argument, which this Article endorses, is
readily available.8 3 As we have just seen, marine environmental
protection is a basic principle and objective of UNCLOS and can
be achieved only if it is so recognized by judicial tribunals.
GATT/WTO does not recognize marine environmental protection
as a basic principle or objective but its dispute settlement provi-
sions must not be allowed to defeat the protection of the marine
environment. In the hypothetical scenario, then, it makes no
difference whether Kuroshito entered into GATT/WTO before or
81. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text
82. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY 93 (1985).
83. See id. at 85-86. Rosenne's argument, at its core, is that Article 311
creates a definite primary obligation that provides for the consequences of its
breach. Since the obligation stipulates that any violation of its provisions
would amount to a nullity, any later obligation contained in another treaty that
violates the primary obligation is a nullity. See id.
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after it joined UNCLOS, because the UNCLOS tribunal would
possess jurisdiction in either event.
This raises the second aspect of this query: What might
happen if GATT/WTO also assumes jurisdiction, creating a situ-
ation in which both UNCLOS and GATT/WTO are adjudicating
the case at the same time? There are no exact precedents gov-
erning such a situation, so recourse must be taken to general
principles of law and to the judicial decisions of various na-
tions8 4 which are applicable in analogous situations.
The world of various legally sovereign nations is an increas-
ingly shrinking, interconnected and transnational world of
global trade and technology that reaches beyond national bound-
aries. The actions of corporations, individuals and groups en-
gaged in trade and communication are subject to the laws of
more than one country and, therefore, to the competing jurisdic-
tion of the forums within those countries.8 5 This is not surpris-
ing because many nations exercise concurrent jurisdiction over
84. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 11, art. 38
(c)-(d).
85. See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
THE QUEST FOR REASONABLENESS (1996). Lowenfeld offers numerous cases sup-
porting his thesis that there is an emerging consensus about the criteria em-
ployed in asserting both legislative and judicial jurisdiction. He argues that
these cases display a confluence between national and international criteria
based on fairness and reasonableness. See id. at 29. In Bier v. Mines de Potasse
d'Alsace SA, 1976 E.C.R. 1735, [1977] 1 C.M.L.R. 284 (1977), a French company
in Alsace discharged massive amounts of chlorides into the Rhine. The chloride
allegedly damaged nursery gardens in Holland. The Dutch Supreme Court up-
held the assertion of jurisdiction by a Dutch court despite the pleas that the
discharge of chlorides was lawful where it took place, in Alsace, France. The
European Court of Justice affirmed, basing its decision on a EEC Convention on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments. Subsequently, a Dutch court
applied Dutch law concerning environmental damage, rejecting the defense
that the conduct was lawful. See LOWENFELD, supra, at 30.
In another case, M, a construction company incorporated in northern Cy-
prus, sued a Turkish bank for $20 million, claiming the Turkish bank had
wrongfully paid that amount to the Libyan government. M first sued in Eng-
land, but the courts there rejected jurisdiction on the basis of forum non con-
veniens in Muduroglou Ltd. v. TC Ziraat Bankasi, 1986 1 Q.B. 1225 (Eng. C.A.).
M then tried Germany, claiming that a German statute gave the German courts
jurisdiction. The German Supreme Court found that the statute should be read
in conjunction with the international competence (or jurisdiction) of the Ger-
man courts, and held that the necessary link required by international law was
not present. See LOWENFELD, supra, at 59-61.
In a third case, a Japanese widow whose husband was killed in Malaysia in
an airline crash sued the Malaysian airline for non-performance of the contract
of carriage. The Malaysian airline, which maintained an office and did business
in Japan, moved to dismiss the suit on the basis that the contract of carriage
was entered into in Malaysia and bore no relation to the business in Japan.
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areas of public law that are common to all nations and peoples,
such as health, safety, trade, economic regulation, communica-
tions, technology and the environment.8 6 The increasing spate
of international litigation reveals the extent to which the na-
tional legal systems of the world are clothed with concurrent,
not exclusive, jurisdiction.87
An important principle that has emerged in Conflicts juris-
prudence is that a duly constituted tribunal within a country,
conferred with jurisdiction by its legal system (primary jurisdic-
tion), is not free to abjure it simply because jurisdiction is con-
currently enjoyed by a foreign forum.88 The principle that a
lawfully constituted tribunal on which primary jurisdiction has
been conferred possesses legislative jurisdiction may be based
upon the view that it is the duty of the court to assume jurisdic-
tion because it would be immoral to subjugate national interests
to those of other nations.8 9 It can also be premised on the more
functional argument that, in the absence of an agreed set of in-
ternationally binding rules determining when courts are right-
fully clothed with legislative jurisdiction, national courts with
primary jurisdiction are bound by the laws of their own country
and should assume jurisdiction when empowered to do so by
their national laws.
As we have seen, many domestic courts relying on principles
of international law have used fairness and reasonableness as
the primary criteria for asserting jurisdiction.90 Additionally,
some commentators have argued that conflict of law principles
are principles of international law because the conflict of laws is
part of the law of nations. 91 Such a claim has a long and distin-
guished lineage, originating with sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century writers on international law such as Grotius, and has
The Japanese Supreme Court, in Gotu v. Malaysian Airlines, applied the princi-
ple of fairness and found that it possessed jurisdiction. See id. at 48-51.
86. Some examples of such overlapping jurisdiction that arose in the
United States courts include economic regulations dealing with bank secrecy,
see United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968), and the
law applicable to air transportation, see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d
909 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
87. See generally BORN, supra note 62.
88. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
177-85 (1963). Currie went further and argued that a court should exercise its
jurisdiction to protect the interests of its own state regardless of whether an-
other state has an interest. See id.
89. See HANS MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 36
(1951).
90. See supra note 85.
91. See LOWENFELD, supra note 85, at 3.
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garnered some judicial support.92 The cogency of their reason-
ing becomes evident when we consider that courts are the or-
gans of government and that international law should
determine the respective merits and jurisdiction of these com-
peting national claims.
This Article advances the view that the absence of custom-
ary and treaty norms in international law for choosing between
competing bases of treaty jurisdiction 93 opens the door to sub-
suming conflict of laws rules as general principles of law. Even
if they are not determinative and binding as general principles
of international law, conflict of laws principles are rationally
compelling and legally persuasive. It is to those principles that
we now turn.
Conflicts over international jurisdiction reflect interest
group struggles within international society similar to those
within a nation's states, in which lawmakers commit their coun-
tries to a variety of different and sometimes conflicting goals,
objectives and programs that jostle for power, and resources. 94
92. See Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 1972-73
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 212-13 (discussing Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional
Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 802-17 (1955)).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 112 (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10,
§ 402.
94. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539, 1542 (1988). The theoretical underpinnings of interest group politics
are traversed by ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956);
ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY
(1961); DAvI BICKNELL TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL IN-
TERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951); ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOV-
ERNMENT 260-61 (1967); THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (2d ed. 1979); E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOC-
RACY IN AMERICA (1960); LESTER W. MILBRATH, THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS
(1963); RAYMOND A. BAUER, ET AL., AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY:
THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN TRADE (1972); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T.
TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986). "Public
Choice" theorists attempt to take this analysis further by applying economic
theory to political decisionmaking and treating the legislative process as a
microeconomic system in which actual political choices are determined by the
efforts of individuals and groups to further their own interests. See DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK,
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY (1957); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST PoPuLISM (1982);
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). For a full review of public
choice literature, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence
of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
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In modern international society, treaties take the place of legis-
lation. Various treaties, backed by differing interest groups,
demonstrate similar characteristics and institutionalize an ar-
ray of goals dealing, for example, with health, communications,
welfare, transportation, human rights, trade and environmental
protection. These varied goals of a pluralistic international com-
munity are potential sources of conflict.
In the case of international organizations, we need to in-
quire whether a treaty has conferred primary jurisdiction on the
tribunal that is invited to hear and determine a case. Framed
this way, it becomes quite clear that UNCLOS confers lawful
authority on its judicial forums to decide the kind of case
brought before it by New Polynesia in the hypothetical situation.
The fact that it has jurisdiction is, however, not determinative.
There are common limitations to the exercise of both legislative
and judicial jurisdiction based on fairness and reasonableness,
which we consider next.
B. COMMON LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
A plethora of conflict of law theories attempt to articulate
the restraining or constraining principles that should guide a
court in deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction. 95 These
theories include vested rights, 96 interest analysis, 97 compara-
tive-impairment, 98 the better rule of law approach, 99 the most
significant relationship, 10 0 and comity. 1° 1 It is not necessary to
choose between these theories as they can be distilled, in the
final analysis, to require simply that the court find a principled
and reasoned basis for its decision. In essence, a court clothed
with legislative jurisdiction must exercise its judicial jurisdic-
tion in a manner that is both politically fair 0 2 and
reasonable. 103
95. See generally LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAws 1-125 (1995).
96. See id. at 47 (citing JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAws (1935)).
97. See id. at 1-125 (1995) (citing CURRIE, supra note 88).
98. See generally William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System,
16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963).
99. See generally Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influenc-
ing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1587-88 (1966).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
101. See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 1-
5 (1991).
102. See BRILMAYER, supra note 95, at 236-37.
103. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403(1).
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Judge Fitzmaurice encapsulated such a view in his separate
opinion in the Barcelona Traction case, where he wrote that:
[I]nternational law does not impose hard and fast rules on States de-
limiting spheres of national jurisdiction .... It does however... in-
volve for every State an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint
as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases hav-
ing a foreign element, and to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdic-
tion more properly appertaining to, or more appropriately exercisable
by another state.
10 4
The Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States lists a number of factors that might guide courts
in determining what is reasonable. 10 5 These principles and
rules could be adopted by the Tribunal in deciding whether to
exercise jurisdiction in the hypothetical case under discussion.
When so adopted, it becomes evident that it is reasonable and
fair for UNCLOS to exercise judicial jurisdiction because (i) the
GATT/WTO displays constitutional defects inconsistent with
the traditions of the international legal system, 10 6 (ii) GATT/
WTO decisions offend justified expectations of an impartial legal
system, 0 7 and (iii) the interpretive role of GATT/WTO judges
nullifies the importance of international environmental
regulation.108
104. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, 105 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice).
105. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 403(2). They include
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state . .
(b) the connections such as nationality, residence, or economic activity
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated [and] the importance of
regulation to the regulating state... ;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions
of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulat-
ing the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 10, § 403(2)(f). See also infra
notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403(2)(d). See also infra
notes 113-42 and accompanying text.
108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 10, § 403(2)(e). See also infra
notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
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1. Constitutional Deficiencies
First, GATT panels are less fair than UNCLOS Tribunals
because they are precluded from taking notice of international
environmental laws, even though these laws constitute an im-
portant segment of international law. In contrast, UNCLOS
Tribunals "shall apply ... other rules of international law not
incompatible with this Convention."10 9 This formulation is more
receptive to international law and less restrictive of non-
UNCLOS law than the comparable provisions of GATT/WTO,
which assiduously and systematically exclude all non-GATT
law.
The law applied by GATT/WTO is confined to that found in
its own treaties and does not recognize any broader corpus of
general international law, let alone IEL.110 Since environmen-
tal protection is not, and never was, a GATT/WTO objective, the
GATT and its Covered Agreements do not deal with environ-
mental protection apart from the exceptions found in GATT
1947, Article XX. It is abundantly clear that the GATT/WTO
panels and Appellate Bodies are bound to restrict themselves to
the DSU and the Covered Agreements, 1 ' which, moreover,
should be interpreted and construed strictly in a way that
neither adds to, nor diminishes the rights and obligations pro-
vided by the treaties. 112
In contrast, UNCLOS tries in various provisions to accom-
modate international law. The general provision dealing with
its relation to other conventions tries to reconcile, not repudiate,
the rights and obligations arising from other agreements. Con-
109. UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 293(1).
110. See GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. 3, cl. 1.
111. See GATT 1994, supra note 4, art. 3, cl. 4. "Recommendations or rul-
ings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of
the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this Under-
standing and under the covered agreements." Id. (emphasis added). "All solu-
tions . . . shall be consistent with those agreements, and shall not nullify or
impair benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements, nor impede the
attainment of any objective of those agreements." Id. art. 7, cl. 5 (emphasis ad-
ded). GATT 1994 Annex II, Article 7 deals with the terms of reference of panels
and confines them to "the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or
agreements cited by the parties to the dispute." Id. art. 7, cl. 2. GATT 1994
Annex II, Article 11 deals with the functions of panels and requires them to
assess the "[aipplicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agree-
ments." Id. art. 11. It does not refer to any other laws or principles.
112. See id. art. 3, cl. 2. This provision states conclusively that
"[riecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements." Id. (emphasis
added).
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sequently, UNCLOS Tribunals can recognize GATT law, while
their GATT counterparts are unable to recognize UNCLOS.
2. Bias
Despite a rhetorical reference to environmental protection
in the hortatory preamble of the WTO,113 GATT/WTO calls for
the advance of free trade effectively unrestrained by environ-
mental constraints. The GATT Secretariat justified such an ad-
vancement of free trade, impervious to environmental concerns,
on the grounds that economic growth is a pre-condition to envi-
ronmental protection. 114 The underlying premise of this asser-
tion is that any environmental damage caused along the way
can be remedied once economic prosperity is achieved. Such a
thesis stands unproven. In fact, the prominent example-the
United States' experience of ex post facto cleaning up of toxic and
hazardous waste sites-demonstrates the contrary. The United
States is the most prosperous nation in the world and has spent
many more billions of dollars cleaning up hazardous waste sites
resulting from the lack of environmental regulation than it
would have if the environmental regulations controlled the crea-
tion and disposal of hazardous wastes earlier in its history." 5
3. GATT/ WTO Decisions
In an apparently candid admission, the GATT Secretariat
conceded that it is reasonable for concerned countries to seek to
change the actions and policies of others that damage the global
environment. 1 6 Unfortunately, GATT does not permit these
countries to bring about change by disallowing products of of-
fending countries from entering their markets.
113. See GATT 1994, supra note 4, preamble.
114. See GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, GATT Doc. 1529,
reprinted in 4 WORLD TRADE MATERIALS 37 (1992).
115. The estimated cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site in the United
States runs between $21 million and $30 million. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 679 (Ruth A. Eblen & William R. Eblen eds., 1994). The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency has identified nearly 41,000 potentially haz-
ardous waste sites across the country. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuAL-
ITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QuALTY: THE TwENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY REPORT 365
(1996). The costs of building a new high-tech, fully-lined landfill designed to
prevent leaching into groundwater, withstand severe weather, and equipped
with modern monitoring equipment is far less. JOSEPH L. BAST ET AL., Eco-
SANITY: A COMMON SENSE GUIDE To ENVIRONMENTALISM 24-28 (1994).
116. See GATr Secretariat, supra note 114, at 18.
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In order to overcome GATT prohibitions against trade re-
strictions,117 it is necessary to provide justification under GATT
1947, Article XX, which provides that,
[slubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which could constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures ....
The most important exceptions, found in paragraphs (b) and (g)
of that Article, allow restrictive measures
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ... [or]
(g) relat[ing] to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption .... 118
The extensive jurisprudence dealing with the nature and
ambit of these exceptions" 9 can not be explored fully in the con-
text of this Article. Instead, this Article takes a functional look
at the application of these exceptions in three recent cases which
offer a baseline for interpreting Article XX exceptions. The very
narrow grounds on which these decisions justify environmental
action do not provide a satisfactory basis for ensuring environ-
mental protection.
117. See GATT 1947, supra note 4, arts. III and XI.
118. GATT 1947, supra note 4, art. XX (b), (g). Additionally, two conditions
must be satisfied before any exception can apply. First, the measure must not
"constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail." Id. art. XX. Second, the measure
must not be a "disguised restriction on international trade." Id.
119. See generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI & ROBERT E. HUDEC, FAIR TRADE AND
HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 57-174 (1996); Richard H.
Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Re-
gional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, 242 (1997);
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environ-
ment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM J. INT'L L. 268, 273-80
(1997); John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Con-
gruence or Conflict? 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1239-42 (1992); Cynthia M.
Maas, Note, Should the WTO Expand GATT Article XX: An Analysis of United
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 5 Mm-N. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 415, 426-27 (1996); Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental
Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26 ENVTL. L. 841, 854-61
(1996); Charles R. Fletcher, Greening World Trade: Reconciling GATT and Mul-
tilateral Environmental Agreements Within the Existing World Trade Regime, 5
J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 341, 352-56 (1996); Kazumochi Kometani, Trade and
Environment: How Should WTO Panels Review Environmental Regulations
Under GATT Articles III and XX?, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 441, 466-76 (1996);
Paul J. Yechout, Note, In the Wake of Tuna II: New Possibilities for GATT-Com-
pliant Environmental Standards, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247, 255-57, 264-68
(1996).
1998] 313
MINN J GLOBAL TRADE
United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna 1)120
was a case in which the United States Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act (MMPA)121 required a ban on the importation of yel-
lowfin tuna caught with nets that resulted in the killing of
dolphins. After years of fruitless negotiation between the
United States and Mexico to establish acceptable limits for
dolphin mortality, the United States placed a total embargo on
the importation of yellowfin tuna caught with dolphin-killing,
rather than dolphin-friendly, nets. 122 Mexico initiated GATT
dispute resolution proceedings, and the GATT Panel held that
the U.S. ban violated GATT and did not fall within the excep-
tions in Article XX(b), (d) or (g).
Three years after Tuna I, in United States - Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna (Tuna II),123 the European Economic Commu-
nity challenged the secondary embargo provisions of the MMPA,
which required any intermediary nation exporting yellowfin
tuna to the United States to provide the relevant authorities
with proof that such tuna had not been caught with dolphin-kill-
ing nets. Once again the GATT Panel ruled against the United
States. According to the Panel, such action was not "necessary"
under Article XX(b) and was not "primarily aimed at" the con-
servation of natural resources under Article XX(g).
Finally, United States - Standards For Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline124 (Reformulated Gasoline Appeal) in-
volved an appeal of a WTO Panel decision in response to Vene-
zuela and Brazil's request for review of pollution standards for
gasoline imposed by the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act.125 The dispute re-
volved around whether domestic refiners were given an unfair
and preferential advantage over foreign refiners in the formula-
tion and setting of the standards. 126 The Appellate Body ruled
120. Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
Sept. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) (reprinted at 30 I.L.M.
1598 (1991)) [hereinafter Tuna I].
121. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1994).
122. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with Preserva-
tion of the Global Commons: Can We Prosper and Protect?, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1407, 1412 (1992).
123. Report of the Panel, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
June 1994, 33 I.L.M. 842 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna III.
124. Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Standards for Reformu-
lated and Conventional Gasoline, May 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 605 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Reformulated Gasoline Appeal].
125. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
126. Report of the Panel, United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Jan. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 276 (1996) [hereinafter Refor-
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that the manner in which the United States determined the
1990 baselines, and the consequent pollution standards for gaso-
line under the Clean Air Act, could not be justified under GATT
Article XX(b), (d) or (g).
In two of these three cases, the United States took action to
protect the environment and did not argue that it was obliged to
do so by treaty. In light of the apparently unilateral nature of
the U.S. actions, a preliminary question is whether GATT/WTO
permits environmental action that has been authorized and
mandated, though not obligated, by a multilateral treaty that
did not include all GATT contractual parties. 127
This question was addressed in Tuna H1.128 The United
States, while not claiming that its actions were obligated by
CITES, 129 did offer treaty justification for its actions. It argued
generally that its actions "were consistent with and directly fur-
thered the objectives"1 30 of CITES and other environmental
treaties and, more specifically, that they were authorized and
empowered by CITES. According to the United States,
mulated Gasoline Decision]. This report noted that the Panel's task was to en-
sure that the provisions and objectives of the General Agreement were
maintained notwithstanding the desirability or necessity of the environmental
objectives of the proposed legislation in dispute. See id. § 7.1. In this case, Ven-
ezuela protested U.S. restrictions on the importation of reformulated gasoline.
Venezuela successfully claimed that the Clean Air Act was discriminatory be-
cause it forced foreign producers to meet U.S. refinery industry averages. See
id. § 6.15.
127. There would be no problem, of course, if the multilateral treaty in-
cluded all GATT parties and was (a) entered into subsequent to GATT, or (b)
seen as a "lex specialis"-a specialist treaty. In both cases, such a multilateral
treaty would trump GATT. See Tuna II, supra note 123, § 3.41.
128. See Tuna I, supra note 123. In that case the European Union (EU)
and the Netherlands successfully initiated GATT proceedings against the
United States similar to Mexico's suit against the United States in Tuna I. The
EU claimed that the United States' intermediary ban on indirect imports of
tuna was hurting European fishing industries. The WTO panel concluded that
'measures taken so as to force other countries to change their policies, and that
were effective only if such changes occurred, could not be primarily aimed ...
at rendering effective restriction on domestic production or consumption." Id.
§ 5.27.
129. See CITES, supra note 22.
130. Tuna I, supra note 123, § 3.14.
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All species of dolphins involved in the fishery of the eastern tropical
Pacific were listed in CITES Appendix II. Moreover, while the United
States was not obligated under CITES to adopt the measures at issue,
CITES specifically provided for these measures in providing for
"stricter domestic measures" in order to further the objectives of that
agreement. The United States measures were stricter domestic meas-
ures, as explicitly contemplated under CITES, taken to protect species
of dolphins that CITES protects. These measures were in addition to
the restrictions on trade in specimens of the dolphins themselves that
are required under CITES.
13 1
Relying upon CITES and other international environmental
treaties, the United States contended that according to interna-
tional law, these treaties should be taken into account as gen-
eral or special rules for interpreting Article XX of GATT. 1
32
Furthermore, the United States argued that the actions taken
by the parties to these multilateral environmental treaties con-
stituted "subsequent practice" under general international law
and Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Treaties. The
Panel gave these arguments short shrift, asserting that CITES
and the other environmental treaties were not subsequent
agreements signed by all the parties to the GATT. With regard
to the use of IEL agreements in the interpretation or application
of Article XX,'133 the Panel bluntly declared that "they did not
apply to the interpretation of the General Agreement or the ap-
plication of its provisions." 134
The Panel, in so holding, was acting in conformity with
GATT law and jurisprudence. The recognition that environmen-
tal treaties should affect the interpretation or application of
GATT would require judicial law-making forbidden to GATT/
WTO panels. 135 In any case, it would be a mistake to argue that
unilateral decisions are more difficult to justify than those based
on multilateral treaties, 136 because there is no distinction made
in the language of Article XX between treaty and non-treaty jus-
131. Id.
132. The United States relied on Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969).
133. See Tuna II, supra note 123, § 3.20.
134. Id. § 5.19.
135. See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
136. Any attempt to draw support for such a proposition from the Tuna II
decision would misconstrue it. In light of its holding that it is not open to a
country to take unilateral measures that force or cajole others into changing
their domestic environmental policies, it is a possible interpretation that such
changes may be made by treaty. Consequently, action taken by treaty to imple-
ment agreed changes of domestic behavior may be justified under GATT/WTO.
However, as this Article explains, the Panel dispelled any such implication
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tifications. There are other ways in which GATT and the deci-
sions of GATT/WTO tribunals can obstruct the implementation
of environmental treaties.
First, the word "necessary" in Article XX(b) has been inter-
preted restrictively13 7 to mean that a government must employ
the measure that is the least inconsistent with GATT. Even
where a measure is required to protect human, animal or plant
life or health, it may well be "unnecessary" in the view of the
GATT/WTO tribunal if the tribunal determines that other more
GATT-consistent measures were available. Consequently, im-
port and export restrictions under CITES could be struck down
on the basis that they are not the least-trade-restrictive meas-
ures available to the country concerned.
Second, Tuna II interpreted "relating to" in Article XX(g) to
allow extra-territorial conservation efforts which had been pro-
hibited by Tuna 1.138 However, the Appellate Body in the Refor-
mulated Gasoline Appeal clarified that such policies should be
aimed primarily at the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources,1 39 as determined by GATT/WTO. This means that a
GATT/WTO tribunal can impugn any action taken under any
IEL convention on the basis that in its view the action is not
aimed primarily at conservation even if the concerned states as-
sert a contrary view.
Third, GATT/WTO tribunals have assumed a disturbing in-
terventionist character. Oblivious of their appellate status, they
appear eager to override the judgment of sovereign nations with
when it held that environmental treaties like CITES, which did not include all
GATT parties, were irrelevant.
137. This happened in Tuna II, supra note 123, where the Panel stated that
the U.S. measures to protect dolphin life or health were not "necessary" because
they failed a proportionality test that requires the use of reasonable alternative
measures not inconsistent with GATT. In the Reformulated Gasoline Decision,
supra note 126, the United States argued that the non-degradation require-
ments of the U.S. Clean Air Act, supra note 125, were "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health." Reformulated Gasoline Decision, supra
note 126, § 3.40. However, the WTO Panel, while noting that gasoline emis-
sions are tied to human health, was more impressed by its finding that im-
ported gasoline was accorded different treatment than United States gasoline
and held that the measures taken were not "necessary." Id. § 6.29. The Appel-
late Body did not deem it necessary to address this question in light of its ruling
that the United States had not satisfied the requirements of the introductory
clause of Article XX by taking actions that constituted "unjustifiable discrimi-
nation" and a "disguised restriction" on international trade. Reformulated Gas-
oline Appeal, supra note 124, at 615.
138. See Tuna I, supra note 120, §§ 5.30-.34.
139. See Reformulated Gasoline Appeal, supra note 124, at 617; see also
Tuna II, supra note 123, §§ 3.52-.53.
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which they disagree and make their own decisions on the facts.
They seem unaware of the need for judicial restraint, deference
to the decisions of national fact-finding bodies or standards of
review that restrain an appellate body from interfering with an
executive action unless it is arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of
discretion. 140
Fourth, Tuna I reiterated the rule that Article XX could be
directed only at products, not at processes or production meth-
ods. 141 It concluded that measures aimed at reducing dolphin
mortality were a production method and thus were not covered
by Article XX(g).
Finally, the Appellate Body in the Reformulated Gasoline
Appeal created another formidable hurdle for states seeking to
claim environmental exemptions under Article XX. It found
that the burden placed on states seeking to come within Article
XX was not confined to satisfying the narrow health, environ-
ment and natural resource exemptions found within paragraphs
(a) through (j). States also must prove that the measures taken
did not violate the chapeau (introductory or preambular provi-
sions) of Article XX, which prohibits "arbitrary" or "unjustified"
discrimination or a "disguised restriction" of free trade. In hold-
ing that the United States had violated the chapeau, the Appel-
late Body demonstrated no hesitation in second guessing the
judgment of, and overruling decisions and rules made by, the
EPA, the administrative agency that makes decisions affecting
U.S. environmental policy. In doing so, it showed scant regard
140. The Appellate Body in the Reformulated Gasoline Appeal freely dis-
missed the difficulties facing the EPA in collecting evidence from foreign coun-
tries in order to give foreign refineries individual baselines. See Reformulated
Gasoline Appeal, supra note 124. There is recognition within trade circles of
this problem. See generally Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute
Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 193 (1996). Unfortunately, these distinguished authors come to
the curious conclusion that a GATT tribunal cannot be compared to a court or
judicial forum reviewing administrative or executive actions in domestic law.
Such a conclusion is at variance with the fundamental assumptions underlying
any allocation of power in an undeveloped international legal order lacking
compulsory jurisdiction. Where sovereign states allocate limited power to a
functional international tribunal under GATT/WTO, such a tribunal ought to
be sensitive to the demarcation of powers between sovereign states and interna-
tional organizations. This should lead to greater, not less, deference to national
decisionmaking.
141. See Tuna I, supra note 120, § 5.15, 5.34.
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for the ordinary and well-recognized principles of according def-
erence to the primary decisionmaker. 142
4. Interpretive Role of GATTI WTO Judges
The DSU defines who may serve as a judge: persons who
have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a repre-
sentative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or
as a representative to the Council or Committee of any covered
agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat,
taught or published on international trade law or policy, or
served as a senior trade policy official of a Member. 14 3 It is
striking that this list does not include anyone with qualifications
outside the field of trade law, such as expertise in international
environmental law.
Article 3(2) of the DSU is an interesting provision that ex-
hibits all the hallmarks of an unresolved disagreement. It reit-
erates that the dispute settlement system should, first,
"preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the cov-
ered agreements," and second, "clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of inter-
pretation of public international law."' 4 4 Then, Article 3(2) im-
mediately attenuates future interpretation by prohibiting any
tribunal from adding or diminishing rights and obligations con-
tained in the covered agreements. 145 This flies in the face of ju-
dicial lawmaking and assumes a set of precise, tailor-made,
predetermined and inflexible rights and duties that can be
mechanically dispensed without any judicial intervention. 146
Such an approach is untenable for a number of reasons.
First, the DSU and the covered agreements were made by
142. See Reformulated Gasoline Appeal, supra note 124, at 629-30 (dis-
missing the EPA's claim of hardship in developing baselines for foreign refiners,
stating that "there was no reason to believe that, given the usual measures
available in international trade for determination of origin and tracking of
goods ... there was any particular difficulty sufficient to warrant the demands
of the baseline establishment methods applied by the United States").
143. GATT 1994, supra note 4, annex II, art. 8(1).
144. Id. art. 3(2).
145. Id.
146. Apart from judicial interpretation, Article IX(2) of the WTO Agreement
allows for "interpretations" that do not "undermine the amendment provisions
in Article X," provided that such an interpretation is agreed to by three-
quarters of the parties. See Michael Lennard, The World Trade Organization
and Disputes Involving Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 5 EuR. ENVTL.
L. REV, 306, 310 (1996). However, the required three-quarters majority renders
this kind of interpretation impracticable, while any interpretation is open to
legal challenge possibly leading to an amendment. See id. at 311.
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humans, not gods, and cannot anticipate the multiplicity of con-
tingencies and circumstances that could give rise to controver-
sies about rights and duties. Second, the DSU and covered
agreements cannot anticipate the law that should be applied in
every situation. Each set of rights and duties should be applied
to the variegated fact situation; the scope of each right and duty
cannot possibly be ordained in advance. That is why interna-
tional instruments are couched in various degrees of general-
ity. 14 7 Third, duties and rights are correlative concepts, 148 but
they are "institutions'? and tools of judicial reasoning for deriv-
ing and assigning benefits and burdens. It has been argued per-
suasively that institutional concepts consist of three sets of
rules: 1) institutive rules specifying situations to which they
might be applied, 2) rules specifying the legal consequences, and
3) terminative rules specifying outcomes. 149 Each step involves
judicial analysis, reasoning, discretion and power within a con-
tinuing time frame to ascertain the nature, scope and applicabil-
ity of indeterminate rights and duties.
The DSU attenuates judicial discretion, or freedom, to
adapt the law to new situations. It defies reality by assuming
that an initial expression of law in a treaty freezes both time
and content. In fact, every expression of law is intended to be
applied to future events over an indefinite period of time, during
which the initial meaning is subject to change.
The customary international rules of interpretation, as re-
stated in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention),' 50 assume there can be no omniscient expression of
rights and obligations that can be applied automatically with
dogmatic immutability. Instead, the Vienna Convention calls
for any treaty to be interpreted according to its ordinary mean-
ing in "[c]ontext and in the light of its object and purpose." In
addition, the Vienna Convention states that any applicable rules
of international law should be taken into account.' 51
147. See HERBERT HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-125 (2d ed. 1994) (dis-
cussing the need for generality in legal communications in order to assure that
the law will apply to everyone in society).
148. See generally WESLEY HOHFELD, FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDIcIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 35-64 (1923).
149. See Neil MacCormick, Law as Institutional Fact, 90 L. Q. REV. 102,
106-07 (1974).
150. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 132 arts. 31-32.
151. See id. art. 31(3)(c). The Appellate Body in the Reformulated Gasoline
Appeal paid pro forma respect to GATT 1994 Article 3(2) and to the rules of
interpretation in the Vienna Convention, which it correctly identified as form-
ing part of customary law. See Reformulated Gasoline Appeal, supra note 126,
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The DSU has apparently rejected the Vienna Convention
criteria by asserting that the rights and obligations set out in
the covered agreements are sufficient for all purposes, and that
earlier references to rules of interpretation in the DSU must be
understood as aspirational and decorative rather than obliga-
tory. GATT/WTO's judicial system appears even more inward-
looking when compared to ICJ jurisprudence. ICJ decisions ap-
ply treaties, international custom, "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations," judicial decisions and the teach-
ings of publicists. 152 The law applied by GATT/WTO is confined
to its own agreements.
In sum, the shortcomings of the GATT/WTO system make it
clear that UNCLOS is entitled to assume legislative jurisdiction.
As a result, the next question that must be addressed is whether
UNCLOS should assume judicial jurisdiction over disputes in
which environmental and trade goals collide.
C. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
Under what circumstances should a court with legislative
jurisdiction exercise that jurisdiction? If a court decides to exer-
cise its judicial jurisdiction and apply the laws of the state where
it is situated, it may forbid a litigant from doing that which is
permitted or even required by the laws of another state. 153 This
is a drastic power that should be subject to some control and
should not be left to the unrestricted discretion of any tribunal.
In his illuminating study of cases dealing with international
conflicts of laws, Lowenfeld demonstrates that the domestic
tribunals of nation states do not always act in a chauvinistic
fashion.154 He describes the Laker litigation, which concerned
two English parties: British Airways and Freddie Laker. At one
point there was an action pending in the United States to enjoin
the suit pending in the United Kingdom, 155 and an anti-anti-
suit injunction pending in the United States. 156 The House of
at 621. Having suggested that GATT/WTO is not to be read in "clinical isola-
tion from public international law," it could not escape, however, the predica-
ment that all its decisions should be subject to the GATT and the covered
agreements. See id.
152. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 11, art. 38.
153. See Akehurst, supra note 92, at 167-69.
154. See LOWENFELD, supra note 85, at 3-15.
155. British Airways Board v. Laker Airways, Ltd., [1983] 3 W.L.R. 544
(C.A).
156. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways et al., 559 F.
Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983).
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Lords, circumventing a U.K. statute relied upon by the British
government, finally determined that the case should be heard in
the United States.15 7
After reviewing a number of cases involving judicial juris-
diction, Lowenfeld concludes that a consensus is emerging about
the relevant criteria for determining jurisdiction. He sees courts
in different countries exercising judgments that are acceptable
by their own states' standards and by those of the international
community.' 58 The three principles discussed below are among
those used by domestic courts.
Proving that GATT/WTO is unfair to IEL establishes the
negative, but it is necessary to demonstrate positively that
UNCLOS tribunals are fair and reasonable. Fairness and rea-
sonableness are expressed through different legal concepts,
among which comity, forum non conveniens and choice of law are
of particular importance to the thesis of this Article. These
three concepts could limit or preclude the assertion of judicial
jurisdiction. It is important for every UNCLOS tribunal to
demonstrate that it acts reasonably and responsibly. If
UNCLOS tribunals are seen to act fairly, reasonably, and ac-
cording to principle, not fiat, we will have reason to expect that
the international community and GATT/WTO will honor their
judgments. It is important, therefore, for UNCLOS tribunals to
follow acknowledged criteria for the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction.
1. Comity
Comity is an umbrella concept, broadly interpreted and ap-
plied in a wide variety of circumstances. It has been defined as
the "basis of international law, a rule of international law, a syn-
onym for private international law, a rule of choice of law, cour-
tesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between sovereigns,"
expediency, necessity and reciprocity.159 It is used in this Article
as a discretionary, conceptual yardstick with which courts can
limit or constrain their jurisdiction to hear claims, apply law,
and consider competing foreign and domestic interests. When so
conceived, comity mitigates the conflicts between competing in-
157. See British Airways Board v. Laker Airways, Ltd. [1985] App. Cas. 58
(appeal taken from U.K.). See generally LOWENFELD, supra note 85, at 5-14 (giv-
ing a detailed account of the events of the Laker action).
158. See LOWENFELD, supra note 85, at 79-80.
159. Paul, supra note 101, at 3-4.
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ternational forums and mediates differences between legal
systems.
Comity is a balancing of the need of one sovereign to regu-
late its internal affairs against the needs of other sovereigns to
engage in similar regulation. 160 This Article adopts the view
that comity blurs the lines dividing public and private interna-
tional law161 and seeks to adapt and apply comity, as defined in
the well-known case of Hilton v. Guyot,162 to the relations of
competing international organizations. When this definition is
adapted and transcribed to the language of intergovernmental
organizations, comity can be defined as neither a matter of abso-
lute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good
will, upon the other, but rather as the recognition that one inter-
governmental tribunal allows to the jurisdiction of another, hav-
ing regard to both international duty and convenience and to the
rights of its own parties or of other community interests pro-
tected by its constitutive treaty. There can be little doubt that
an UNCLOS tribunal, guided by the principles of comity, will
need to fairly and carefully consider how it should exercise its
jurisdiction.
2. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens was described suc-
cintly by Paxton Blair in his classic article as "the discretionary
power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction
whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more appro-
priately tried elsewhere.' 63 Lord Shaw explicated the rationale
for the doctrine in a decision of the House of Lords: "If in the
whole circumstances of the case it be discovered that there is a
real unfairness to one of the suitors in permitting the choice of a
160. See Gau Shan Co. Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354-55
(6th Cir. 1992) (discussing the concept of comity, building on the Laker Airways
analysis).
161. See Paul, supra note 101, at 74-77 (stating that comity should expand
the roles of public policy, public law and international politics in U.S. courts).
162. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). That definition read,
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.
Id.
163. Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-Ameri-
can Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1929).
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forum which is not the natural or proper forum . . . then the
doctrine of forum non conveniens is properly applied."1 64
An UNCLOS tribunal must consider whether it is in fact an
appropriate forum. Forum non conveniens is premised on con-
venience, and it may be invoked to deny judicial jurisdiction
even if the tribunal might claim that its assumption of legisla-
tive jurisdiction was fair and reasonable. It is conceivable,
therefore, that an UNCLOS Tribunal with legislative jurisdic-
tion may find that the application of this doctrine requires it to
decline judicial jurisdiction in favor of a more suitable GATT/
WTO Panel that is substantially more convenient to the parties
or appropriate for the task.165
On the facts of our hypothetical case, could the UNCLOS
tribunal find that the GATT/WTO Panel is more suitable? The
result of any such decision must depend on the particular facts
of the dispute, and the facts of the instant scenario do not
demonstrate that it could be more conveniently tried elsewhere.
While there may be a number of reasons for invoking the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens in disputes involving domestic
courts,' 1 6 6 it will generally be difficult to show that one interna-
tional tribunal is more convenient than another. The difficulties
confronted by litigants in domestic courts do not exist in interna-
tional tribunals because all litigants face a level playing field. It
164. La Socigtg du Gaz de Paris v. La Socigtg Anonyme de Navigation "Les
Armateurs Francais" [19261 Sess. Cas. 13, 20 (H.L.).
165. See BORN, supra note 62, at 289-318 (surveying the methods used by
domestic courts hearing international cases and applying forum non
conveniens).
166. First, where the parties are from two different countries, one party may
enjoy clear advantages in litigating the case in its own domestic forum as com-
pared to a foreign court for obvious economic, cultural, social and legal reasons.
Second, even where parties are from the same country, as in the Laker litiga-
tion, the substantive, procedural and evidentiary laws in a foreign forum may
be more favorable to one litigant for reasons of substantive law, pertaining, for
example, to damages. Apart from substantive rules, there may be differences
in applicable procedural rules, for example, the service of summons, the en-
forcement of judgments, and the awarding of costs. Furthermore, evidentiary
rules pertaining to the burden of proof and offering of evidence can be quite
different. Third, proximity to witnesses and resources may make one forum
less expensive than another. Fourth, there may be linguistic and cultural barri-
ers that make one forum preferable to another. Fifth, one tribunal may be will-
ing to assert jurisdiction over parties, in situations where another would not.
Finally, forum non conveniens is not limited to the parties and may be invoked
by the court itself for various public policy reasons, including, for example, that
domestic courts should not be choked with foreign actions or that the taxpayers
of one country should not bear the costs of litigation instituted by foreigners.
See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Laker
litigation).
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is possible that an international forum may be closer to one
country than another, but in this age of mass air transit, that is
hardly a significant advantage.
3. Choice of Law
A final question relates to the choice of law. We have seen
that UNCLOS is considerably more inclusive than GATT/WTO
and that it can apply any law that is not contrary to the provi-
sions of UNCLOS. Many proponents of free trade contend that
GATT/WTO is not antithetical to environmental protection. 167
If that is indeed the case, the tribunal can take GATT law into
account in arriving at its decision. Unlike GATT/WTO panels,
which are prohibited from considering international environ-
mental laws, UNCLOS tribunals can consider GATT/WTO law
provided it is not contrary to UNCLOS. 168 By bringing trade
law within their purview, UNCLOS tribunals will emerge as in-
ternational forums in which cases involving both trade and the
environment can be heard and decided fairly, reasonably and ac-
cording to comity.
The fact that conflicting jurisdiction does not always give
rise to judicial anarchy still does not answer every important
question. What about the two interconnected questions of the
race to the courthouse and the implementation or enforcement
of conflicting orders? The race to the courthouse may make
sense in national legal systems built upon a system of vertical
authority, where valid court orders are enforced and imple-
mented by the civil (executive) authorities of a country. Such a
race does not, however, present the same opportunities in a con-
sensual and horizontal international legal system devoid of in-
stitutionalized enforcement of judicial orders.
The enforcement of judicial orders will remain a perennial
problem under the present consensual system of international
law. Even if a country obtained a judgment under either UN-
CLOS or GATT/WTO, there is no guarantee that it would be en-
forced by the countries involved. In the case of our hypothetical
167. See, e.g., Sabrina Shaw, Trade and Environment: The Post-Singapore
WTO Agenda, 6 REV. EuR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 105, 106 (1997)
(enumerating a number of provisions in the WTO which provide for the use of
trade-related measures to be used in protecting a state's environment). This is
also the assumption behind the Report of the Committee on Trade and the En-
vironment (CTE), dated Nov. 12, 1996, which is available through the WTO's
web site by visiting <http://www.wto.org/ddf/ep/public.html> and searching for
document symbol WT/CTE/1.
168. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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situation, a number of outcomes are possible. Under the best-
case scenario for New Polynesia, UNCLOS assumes and exer-
cises jurisdiction while GATT/WTO declines to do so.
Legally, the parties to an UNCLOS proceeding are obliged
to implement the decisions of the Tribunal under Article 296 of
UNCLOS, according to which a decision "shall be final and shall
be complied with by all the parties." However, there is no en-
forcement agency to secure compliance. In the final analysis, it
must be left to the UNCLOS tribunal to convince all parties that
it is a fair and reasonable judicial tribunal that has given them a
satisfactory and balanced judicial hearing. The parties should
come away from such a proceeding not with a sense of grievance,
but with a sense of having received justice in an orderly and im-
partially administered judicial forum. The onus will be upon the
UNCLOS tribunal to demonstrate these attributes. If it does,
added psychological weight will attach to the order, and it will
be enforced. By a parity of reasoning, the same would apply to
the best-case scenario for Kuroshito, where the GATT/WTO as-
sumes and exercises jurisdiction and UNCLOS declines to do so.
But what if both the UNCLOS tribunal and the GATT/WTO
panel assumed and exercised jurisdiction, and the UNCLOS tri-
bunal ruled in favor of New Polynesia while the GATT/WTO
Panel ruled for Kuroshito? If both parties pressed for implemen-
tation, the matter might need to be resolved by the ICJ. The ICJ
is not an international appellate court but could assume such a
role if called upon to do so.16 9 If the parties decided against re-
course to the ICJ, a stalemate would have to be resolved accord-
ing to non-judicial channels of diplomacy and comity.
From the standpoint of IEL, such a worst-case scenario is
not a deterrent to invoking the jurisdiction of UNCLOS. Cur-
rently, IEL functions without recourse to any particular judicial
forum, and the opportunity to avail itself of the jurisdiction of
UNCLOS would constitute a major step forward. The worst-
case scenario would still leave room for diplomatic maneuvering,
which would not have been possible without UNCLOS.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article does not purport to predict how UNCLOS tribu-
nals will decide the cases brought before them. The results are
by no means a foregone conclusion because these forums will be
169. This could be done through a Special Agreement of Compromis under
Article 36(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, see supra note 11.
326 [Vol. 7:287
SHOULD UNCLOS oR GAI/ WTODEcIDE?
called upon to address difficult substantive questions, such as
those relating to the legality of treaty-authorized actions and the
more controversial unilateral measures taken by the United
States to protect the international environment.
The limited objective of this Article is primarily to show that
Conflicts principles can be relied upon to answer questions that
arise when two international tribunals, such as GATT/WTO and
UNCLOS, enjoy concurrent and conflicting jurisdiction. In es-
sence, we have seen that questions of jurisdiction should be re-
solved according to principles of fairness and reasonableness.
This Article concludes that UNCLOS tribunals are able to apply
such principles in a way that the GATT/WTO forums cannot.
Because it enjoys a monopoly over trade and environment
litigation, GATT/WTO has been used more frequently for set-
tling environmental disputes between states than has any other
international dispute settlement mechanism. 170 This is in spite
of the fact that the "intention and aspiration"' 71 of the drafters
of the DSU was to create a self-contained regime. Moreover,
many within GATT/WTO view this regime as "a sealed, self-con-
tained set of relationships that have little to do with public in-
ternational law or international civic society.' 7 2
Until now, a variety of calls for reform have gone unheeded.
The environmental lacunas in GATT have led to suggestions
that GATT be "greened"'7 3 through procedural, textual and sub-
stantive reforms.' 74 However, the reform initiative did not get
170. See Steve Charnovitz, Improving the Trade and Environment Regimes,
in ASIAN DRAGONS AND FREE TRADE 154, 163 (Simon S.C. Tay & Daniel C. Esty
eds., 1996) (citing ERNEST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND (1996)).
171. See Shinya Murase, Unilateral Measures and the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment, in ASIAN DRAGONS AND FREE TRADE, supra note 170, at 137, 141.
172. Charnovitz, supra note 170, at 156.
173. A succinct and perceptive summary of these views is found in DANIEL
C. EsTY, GREENING THE GATT 205-24 (1994).
174. See id. These reforms include
establishing procedures for environmental assessments of trade
agreements; building greater transparency into GATT negotiations to
assure the requisite environmental input; restructuring GATT dispute
settlement procedures; sanctifying the trade measures used to enforce
international environmental agreements; broadening the scope of
GATT's environmental provisions (particularly [GATT 1947] Article
XX); ... clarifying the bases on which environmental trade measures
may be used to discipline environmentally inadequate production
processes and methods; defining appropriate bounds for unilateral
trade actions in support of environmental policies; [and] "developing
guidelines for eco-labeling and packaging requirements.
Id. at 223.
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off to a promising start when it was excluded from the Uruguay
Round, which resulted in the new WTO in 1994. Soon after-
wards, a decision of the Group on Environmental Measures and
International Trade (GEMIT) declined to formulate new rules
for dealing with trade sanctions mandated by agreements such
as the Montreal Protocol, the Basel Convention and CITES. In-
stead it opted for a case-by-case determination after the
event. 
175
Another initiative has fared no better. In 1995, after the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the GATT Committee on
Trade and Environment (CTE) was formed. 176 CTE's mandate
was to examine trade and environmental issues within the letter
and spirit of the new trade regime and to submit its first report
to the first WTO Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in De-
cember 1996.177 Given that its deliberations were governed by
trade concerns, effectively ignoring the existence of, and need
for, environmental standards, 178 it is not surprising that the
CTE failed to make any concessions to multilateral trade agree-
ments containing trade sanctions. While the CTE does profess a
post-Singapore agenda, its mandate prevents it from being an
engine of reform.
The existence of another forum that can challenge the judi-
cial monopoly of GATT/WTO might generate genuine reform
within that organization. Reforming GATT/WTO to include con-
sideration of IEL would advance international comity by head-
ing off a potentially damaging conflict. Moreover, doing so
might preserve its judicial hegemony and thereby promote the
enlightened self-interest of GATT/WTO.
175. See Bill O'Connor & Anthony Van de Ven, Trade and Environment: An
Update on the GATT Agenda, 4 EuR. ENVTL L. REV. 20, 21 (1995).
176. See Trade and Environment, Decision of 15 April, 1994, reprinted in
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
469 (1994).
177. See Shaw, supra note 167, at 106.
178. See id. "[Tihere is no intention that the WTO should become an envi-
ronmental agency, nor that it should get involved in reviewing natural environ-
mental priorities, setting environmental standards or developing global policies
on the environment.. .". Id.
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